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Abstract
Transport-related Fringe Benefits: Implications for Commuting and
Relocation
Fringe benefits of various kinds have become an essential element of mod-
ern labour market mechanisms. Firms offer transport-related fringe benefits
such as transport subsidies (company cars, travel and parking subsidies)
and relocation subsidies to job applicants. The spatial implications of these
fringe benefits have hardly received any systematic attention thus far. The
present paper addresses this largely unexplored issue. Using information
from a survey on firms’ recruitment behaviour in the UK, this paper demon-
strates that the applicants’ journey-to-work time induces firms to offer var-
ious transport-related fringe benefits to job applicants. The implications
of these transport-related fringe benefits for commuting and relocation are
rather distinct. Transport subsidies discourage applicants, whereas reloca-
tion subsidies induce applicants to move closer to the workplace. We interpret
the results as evidence that employers offer transport-related fringe benefits
either to reduce the length of the journey to work or to compensate employees
for the incurred commuting costs.
Keywords: fringe benefits, company car, residential mobility
JEL-code: J33, J41, R29
1 Introduction
As non-wage compensation has become an increasingly important portion
of employees’ compensation, fringe benefits have become an important ele-
ment in the bargaining process between firms and employees (Ehrenberg and
Smith, 2000). Firms tend to offer transport-related fringe benefits such as
transport subsidies and relocation subsidies to recruit new employees (see
Barber, 1998). The relationship between firms’ recruitment policies, com-
muting behaviour and transport-related fringe benefits, however, have re-
ceived hardly any systematic attention. This lack of attention is rather sur-
prising, because the effectiveness of transport policies directed at reducing
commuting flows (such as road pricing or pay lanes) is thought to depend on
these fringe benefits (Department of Transport, 1998). Transport subsidies
such as company cars or travel and parking subsidies make employees less
sensitive to the real costs of commuting, whereas relocation subsidies - re-
ceived when the employee moves closer to the workplace - induce employees
to reduce the journey to work.
Fringe benefits often include company cars, travel and parking subsidies
(see Rock and Berger, 1991). In Europe, 42 percent of all new personal
cars sold are company cars. In the United Kingdom, the share of company
cars is about 52 percent, the highest in Europe (see Economist Intelligence
Unit, 1996). In the United States, fringe benefits often include subsidised or
free parking (Shoup and Wilson, 1992; Shoup, 1994). Many firms also offer
relocation subsidies to new employees at the moment of hiring. In the UK,
25 percent of new managerial and professional employees receive a relocation
subsidy (RCI, 2001). Summarising, there is abundant evidence that firms
offer a wide range of transport-related fringe benefits.
The large-scale use of transport-related fringe benefits prompts two re-
search questions: (i) to what extent do firms’ fringe benefits policies depend
on the applicants’ journey to work? and (ii) which are the spatial-economic
implications - in terms of commuting and relocation behaviour of employees
- of transport-related fringe benefits? In the present paper we will address
these issues in more detail, mainly from an applied perspective.
The structure of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the
theoretical background of the paper. Section 3 consists of a description of
transport-related fringe benefits. This analysis is based on a survey of large
firms in the United Kingdom and focuses on the fringe benefits packages
offered to full-time appointed managerial and professional employees. In
Section 4, we analyse the effect of applicants’ journey-to-work time on the
probability that firms offer a combination of transport and relocation subsi-
dies using a multinomial logit model. In addition, we test whether transport
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subsidies have a negative effect - and whether relocation subsidies have a pos-
itive effect - on the probability of moving residence closer to the organisation.
Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Background
The reasons why firms offer transport subsidies are many and can be found
in the fringe benefits and compensation literature. One insight from this
literature is that there will be compensation for job characteristics that are
viewed as undesirable by workers (Ehrenberg and Smith 2000). This explains
why firms offer monetary transport subsidies (as evidenced by the studies of
Kasper (1983) and Van Ommeren et al. (2000), which find a positive relation-
ship between monetary compensation and the workers’ commute). Another
prominent insight from this literature is that payments in kind do not gener-
ate as much as cash payments of equal monetary value, but these payments
may be attractive when they are accorded special tax treatment (Scott et
al., 1998). As a result, firms have an incentive to supply company cars to
job applicants, particularly when these job applicants face large commuting
costs. Job applicants with short commutes are more likely to prefer pay-
ments in cash rather than a company car, because they are less likely to use
the car for the journey to work. This last insight is important, because it
makes clear that firms’ compensation and recruitment policies depend on the
workers’ journey to work in particular and the transport system in general.
In other words, it is plausible that the length of the commute induces firms
to offer transport subsidies to compensate workers for the inconvenience of
commuting. The current paper therefore aims to test the effect of the work-
ers’ commute on the probability that firms offer transport subsidies to job
applicants.
It is noteworthy that one of the main results in the urban economics
literature, addressing a stylised monocentric urban area, is that employees
are fully compensated for the commuting costs via adjustment of dwelling
prices (Alonso 1964; Zax 1991). In this special case, firms do not offer any
compensation to employees for their commuting costs, because these employ-
ees are compensated via dwelling prices. In this case, one should not find
any relationship between monetary transport subsidies and the employees’
journey-to-work. Although the ’wasteful commuting’ debate on the useful-
ness of this model suggests that many employees are not fully compensated
via the housing market (Hamilton, 1982; 1989; Small and Song, 1992), it
seems plausible that monetary transport subsidies are less frequently offered
to job applicants when the firm is located in a large urban area (such as
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London) than in more rural areas.
A major theme in the residential mobility literature is that employees
have an incentive to move residence closer to the workplace to reduce com-
muting costs (Rossi, 1955). Whether employees will actually move depends
on many factors, but particularly on the level of the relocation costs (Wein-
berg et al., 1981; Zax, 1991). In the context of fringe benefits this is relevant,
because it implies that firms have an incentive to offer relocation subsidies
as a substitute for transport subsidies. In other words, the firm pays once
relocation subsidies upfront, but will pay less transport subsidies later on.
Clearly, the firms’ benefits of subsidising relocation increase with the length
of the employees’ journey-to-work. The current paper aims to examine this
insight by testing whether the job applicants’ journey-to-work time increases
the probability that firms offer relocation subsidies to applicants.
The spatial effects of transport and relocation subsidies are plausibly dis-
tinct. We hypothesise that relocation subsidies encourage employees to move
residence closer to the workplace, because the relocation costs are reduced.
Further, we hypothesise that transport subsidies discourage employees to
move residence, because employees are compensated for the commuting costs.
The current paper aims to test these hypotheses by estimating the effects of
transport and relocation subsidies on the probability that job applicants will
move residence.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a representative organisational survey of
firms with at least twenty-five employees in the United Kingdom in Decem-
ber 2000 (RCI, 2001). In total, we have 337 observations. Respondents
are mainly human resource managers, recruitment specialists and in case of
smaller firms, managing directors or finance directors. The median size of
the firms in the sample is 250 employees. Almost 50% of the firms belong
to larger companies. The survey contains a large number of questions on
recruitment issues and background variables. Our analysis focuses on re-
sponses to a range of questions related to the latest managerial/professional
appointment the respondent was personally involved in. The respondent
had to answer questions on a number of transport-related fringe benefits of-
fered to the applicant, including company car, travel and parking subsidy,
and housing subsidy or relocation subsidy. The respondent had to exclude
internal and part-time appointments.
The descriptive statistics, shown in Table 1, indicate that for 71% of
the applicants, the journey-to-work time is less than 1 hour. For 10% of
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the applicants, the journey to work is more than 11
2
hour. Most applicants
operate at a senior or middle level (74%). In the sample, 20% of the firms are
located in London, whereas 16% have difficulties in attracting managerial and
professional applicants. After accepting the job offers, 23% of the applicants
move residence as a consequence of accepting the job.
[Table 1]
A minority of applicants receive different types of transport-related fringe
benefits into one package. To facilitate the analyses, we will focus on five
mutually exclusive packages of transport-related fringe benefits (see Table 1).
Three packages include only one type of benefit, a fourth package combines
several types and also includes housing subsidy. The fifth package refers to
those applicants who were not offered any transport-related fringe benefit.
The data show that 36% of applicants are not offered any transport-related
fringe benefit, whereas 42% receive one type of benefit. Only 20% receive a
combination of benefits.
4 Estimation Results
We will present now the estimation results for the effect of journey-to-work
time on the probability that firms offer a range of transport-related fringe
benefits to job applicants. We estimate a multinomial logit model thereby
controlling for a large number of characteristics (cf. Maddala 1983). The
estimation results are presented in Table 2. Of particular interest is the
effect of commuting time on the probability of a transport-related fringe
benefit offer. The estimation results indicate that the journey-to-work time
has a positive effect on the probability that a firm offers any type of transport-
related fringe benefits package (a company car, relocation subsidy, travel and
parking subsidy or a combination). Note that the journey-to-work time has
only a statistically significant effect if the journey-to-work time is sufficiently
long. For short trips, time does not induce firms to offer a company car or
a relocation subsidy. This finding makes sense. Firms have less incentive to
offer fringe benefits to applicants who live nearby. Also, labour supply theory
implies that employees’ (dis-)utility of commuting is a convex function of the
journey-to-work time (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000), which may explain the
latter result.
Furthermore, the results indicate that the probability of offering transport-
related fringe benefits packages depends primarily on the size of the firm, the
sector within which the firm operates, and whether the firm is located in
London. Larger firms, measured by the number of employees, offer com-
pany cars and relocation subsidies more often, contrary to firms in public
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services, and firms located in London. In contrast to popular opinion, firms’
recruitment difficulties do not induce additional fringe benefits offers. In
conclusion, the offer of transport fringe benefits and relocation subsidies is
positively influenced by the journey-to-work time.
[Table 2]
We have shown above that the journey-to-work time induces firms to
offer transport and relocation subsidies. We will address now the effects
of transport subsidies on the decision of applicants to move closer to the
workplace. The estimation results for different specifications of a probit
model are shown in Table 3.
The results, as shown in the last column of Table 3, demonstrate that
a relocation subsidy offer has a strong positive effect on the probability of
moving residence. This implies that by offering a relocation subsidy firms
induce employees to move closer to the workplace, reducing the employees’
journey-to-work time. In contrast to a relocation subsidy, a transport subsidy
discourages applicants to move residence closer to the workplace. Hence, the
spatial-economic implications of the choice to offer transport or relocation
subsidies, are rather distinct. The statistical findings also provide evidence
of strong positive effects of the journey-to-work time on the probability of
moving residence.
In the empirical implementation of the model we also tested whether the
relocation subsidy needs to be considered endogenous. For example, it may
be the case that firms offer relocation subsidies when the applicants announce
their intention to move residence closer to the workplace. An endogeneity
test, however, indicates that this is not the case (results can be found in
the Appendix). Also, we estimated a range of specifications to check the
robustness of the results. By and large, the model results turn out to be
rather robust and do not differ much, as can been seen from Table 3.
[Table 3]
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5 Conclusions
There is only little knowledge about the way and the extent to which ap-
plicants’ journey-to-work time influence firms’ human resource management
policies and practices, including the recruitment and compensation practices.
This is rather surprising, since the effectiveness of public policies directed at
influencing the commuting behaviour of employees (e.g., by road pricing, con-
struction of new roads, etc) is influenced by the firms’ policies and practices.
For example, it is common knowledge that in many European countries (for
example, the Netherlands or France) collective bargaining agreements explic-
itly include commuting related compensation levels. In Japan, large firms
tend to compensate employees fully for the monetary travel-to-work costs.
Moreover, many firms tend to offer relocation subsidies to new recruits. This
paper emphasized the importance of transport-related fringe benefits for com-
muting and residential relocation behaviour of employees.
We have demonstrated that firms’ fringe benefits offers depend strongly
on the applicants’ journey-to-work time. Employing data on firms’ recruit-
ment of managerial and professional employees in the United Kingdom, we
were able to show that the applicants’ journey-to-work time at the moment
of application, has a strong positive effect on the probability that a firm of-
fers a transport subsidy in the form of company cars or travel and parking
subsidies. Furthermore, we found that the applicants’ journey-to-work time
induces firms to offer a relocation subsidy.
The firms’ choice between offering transport or relocation subsidies has
strong implications for public policy which focuses on the external cost of
commuting (congestion and pollution). Transport subsidies discourage the
employee to move closer to the workplace, whereas relocation subsidies en-
courage employees to move closer to the workplace. Firms offer transport
subsidies to compensate for commuting cost or to subsidize relocation to
reduce these costs. Although firms may to a large extent be indifferent be-
tween offering transport or relocation subsidies, society at large is certainly
not indifferent.
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Appendix:
Endogeneity of a Relocation Subsidy
To test for endogeneity of the relocation subsidy on the probability of a
residential move, we extend the univariate Probit model to:
Y ∗1 = X1β + Y2γ + u1
Y ∗2 = X2δ + u2
where the variable Y ∗1 denotes the inclination to move, the variable Y
∗
2 de-
notes the inclination to offer a relocation subsidy, such that
Y1 = 1 iff Y
∗
1 > 0
Y2 = 1 iff Y
∗
2 > 0,
where Y1 denotes the decision to move and Y2 the offer of a relocation subsidy,
X1 and X2 are sets of regressors, and u1 and u2 error terms. Exogeneity of
Y2 can be tested by a simple t-test of the hypothesis that the correlation
between the error terms, ρ(u1, u2) equals zero.
Table 4 gives estimation results for a bivariate probit model. The corre-
lation coefficient is not significantly different from zero (with t-value of 0.54).
The null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected on the basis of our data.
We also considered other specifications which rendered the same conclusion.
[Table 4]
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